Early game theory models of aggressive signaling predicted that aggressive signals would be unreliable because all signalers would be selected to exaggerate their signals regardless of their aggressive intentions. Recently some signals have been shown to convey reliable information about aggressive intentions, but in all cases reliability is limited. Here we test whether limits to reliability are due to exaggeration of aggressive intentions, or 'bluffing', as originally envisioned. Our earlier work on two related songbird species, song sparrows (Melospiza melodia) and swamp sparrows (M. georgiana), has shown that low intensity 'soft song' is the signal that best predicts attack in both cases. Here we test two predictions of the bluffing hypothesis: (1) that the distribution of the number of soft songs given per signaler should be skewed towards high values because of widespread exaggeration and (2) that unreliability should arise from over-signaling (giving many displays and not attacking) rather than from under-signaling (giving few or no displays and attacking). Neither prediction is upheld in either species. We propose that the surprising prevalence of under-signaling can be explained by the opportunity costs of aggressive signaling.
Introduction
Theory leads us to expect aggressive signals to have at best only limited reliability. An animal signal is said to be reliable if some characteristic of the signal is consistently correlated with an attribute of the signaler or its environment that receivers benefit from knowing about (Searcy & Nowicki, 2005) . Limited reliability then means that such a correlation exists but is imperfect. Receivers in aggressive situations benefit from knowing about two aspects of a signaler: its fighting ability and its aggressive intentions. Signals of fighting ability are often index signals (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003) , that is signals constrained to be honest because of a causal connection between physical attributes of the sender and characteristics of the signal. Signals of aggressive intent, by contrast, are often 'free strategic choice' signals, which any signaler is able to produce (Hurd & Enquist, 2005) . Thus, signals of aggressive intent in particular are expected to have limited reliability. Underlying this theoretical expectation is the assumption that when receivers take signals of aggressive intent seriously, bluffing on the part of signalers is likely to be favored (Maynard Smith, 1979) . Empirically, signals of aggressive intent often turn out to have limited reliability, for example in the song sparrows (Melospiza melodia) and swamp sparrows (M. georgiana) that we have studied (Searcy et al., 2006; Ballentine et al., 2008) . Here we ask whether reliability of these signals is really limited for the reason proposed, that is because of the advantages of bluffing.
Before proceeding we need to define some terms for describing unreliable signaling. Assume for simplicity that we can dichotomize both aggressive signals (signals are either aggressive or non-aggressive) and aggressive behavior (an individual either attacks or does not attack). There are then two behavior patterns that we would regard as honest: an individual gives an aggressive signal and then attacks, or it gives a non-aggressive signal (or no signal) and then does not attack. To date, both theory (Enquist, 1985; Számadó, 2000) and empirical work (Steger & Caldwell, 1983; Adams & Caldwell, 1990) have concentrated on one of two possible dishonest patterns, that in which an individual gives an aggressive signal but then does not attack. If this behavior has evolved because the signaler benefits from deceiving the receiver, we would say that the signaler is bluffing. The behavior pattern, however, could occur for other reasons, for example because of error on the part of the signaler (Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2000; Botero et al., 2010) , or because some contingency intervenes after the signal to prevent attack (Searcy et al., 2006) , such as retreat of the receiver or the appearance of a predator. Therefore, we need a term that designates the pattern as opposed to the strategy; we will term the pattern (aggressive signal/no attack) 'oversignaling'. For completeness, a second unreliable signaling pattern must be recognized: when an individual gives a non-aggressive signal (or no signal) and then attacks anyway. We call this pattern 'under-signaling', following Akcay et al. (in press) . Again, the under-signaling pattern could be produced either as an adaptive strategy or in error; we will refer to the adaptive strategy of under-signaling as 'low-balling'.
The first game theory analyses of aggressive communication concluded that signals of aggressive intent should not be at all reliable because of the benefits of bluffing (Maynard Smith, 1974 , 1979 Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976; Caryl, 1979) . Maynard Smith (1979) provides a clear exposition of the reasoning behind this conclusion:
"Suppose that a population existed in which individuals conveyed accurate information about their 'intentions' -i.e., about the level to which they would escalate. If an individual found that an opponent was announcing a higher intention than its own, it would pay to retreat at once. Therefore a 'lying' mutant which announced a very high (but untrue) intention would be favoured by selection. Before long, everyone would be lying, and it would then pay to ignore the message being transmitted" (Maynard Smith, 1979, p. 481-482) .
We refer to the idea that bluffing is the main impediment to reliable aggressive signaling as the 'bluffing hypothesis'.
Aggressive signaling theory has devoted much more attention to bluffing than to low-balling. Enquist (1985) provided the first game theory model showing that reliable signaling of aggressive intentions could be an evolutionarily stable strategy despite the benefits of bluffing. In this model, signalers can give either a signal of strength or a signal of weakness. Honest signalers give the signal of strength if they are strong and the signal of weakness if they are weak. Weak individuals are expected to concede if the opponent gives the signal of strength, and to attack if it gives the signal of weakness. Strong individuals attack if an opponent gives the signal of strength, and wait for an opponent to concede if it gives the signal of weakness, attacking only if the opponent fails to concede. Note that in this model signals are informative about aggressive intentions only if receiver response is controlled, either experimentally or statistically, a stipulation that we can also expect to apply in real-world signaling. Bluffing in this model has a benefit, in that weak individuals that bluff win contests against weak individuals that are honest. Bluffing also has a cost, in that giving the signal of strength may embroil a weak individual in fights with strong individuals, fights that it could avoid if honest. Enquist concluded that if the cost to a weak individual of fighting a strong individual is sufficiently high, then the cost of bluffing can outweigh the benefit, and reliable signaling can be evolutionarily stable.
Later models showed that both bluffing and honesty could occur at equilibrium. Számadó (2000) , for example, used the same model framework as Enquist (1985) , but allowed for the possibility of a mixed strategy in which weak individuals bluff with probability P and are honest with probability 1 − P . Számadó (2000) concluded that such a mixed strategy can be an ESS. In place of the symmetric game examined by Enquist (1985) and Számadó (2000) , Gardner & Morris (1989) investigated an asymmetric game, in which the signaler is a territory resident and the receiver is an intruder, and the two differ in how much information they have on their relative fighting abilities. Note that the asymmetry of this game makes it especially appropriate as a model for the territorial signaling systems we study. Gardner & Morris (1989) concluded that, depending on the values assigned to the cost of display and the benefit of winning the contest, such a system can be dominated by honest signaling or by bluffing, or can show an unstable coexistence of both.
Some signaling models have considered the possibility of low-balling as an adaptive strategy. In a badge of status model, Owens & Hartley (1991) posited a 'Trojan Sparrow' strategy, in which a strong individual displays a small badge, signifying weakness. The fate of this strategy was determined by other assumptions the authors made about the behavior of such individuals (Johnstone & Norris, 1993) , rather than by their under-signaling behavior. In a second badge of status model, Johnstone & Norris (1993) allowed a 'modest' strategy, in which again a strong individual displays a small badge, but this time with no additional assumptions about how it behaves. Johnstone & Norris (1993) concluded that a modest strategy can invade and disrupt an honest signaling system unless strength is given an additional cost that is independent of fighting. What seems to be happening in this model, however, is that strength is favored over weakness, rather than dishonesty over honesty. Szalai & Számadó (2009) pitted various signaling strategies against each other over many generations in a simulation of the symmetric game framework of Enquist (1985) . One strategy gives the signal of weakness and then attacks, and thus corresponds to a low-balling strategy. This strategy did not do well in competition with other strategies.
If theory has paid more attention to bluffing than to low-balling, the same is true of empirical work. A number of empirical studies have produced evidence of bluffing, most notably in crustaceans (Christy & Rittschof, 2011) .
Perhaps the best evidence is from the stomatopod Gonodactylus bredeni, in which newly molted individuals continue to brandish their enlarged chelae in the aggressive meral spread display, even though molting renders those appendages useless as weapons (Steger & Caldwell, 1983; Adams & Caldwell, 1990) . Other examples involve snapping shrimp, fiddler crabs and crayfish using claw size to exaggerate their strength (Backwell et al., 2000; Hughes, 2000; Wilson et al., 2007; Lailvaux et al., 2009 ). Low-balling in crustaceans has received less attention, but Christy & Rittschof (2011) suggest that crayfish and lobsters may sometimes low-ball their opponents by withholding chemical signals of threat in their urine, a strategy these authors refer to as 'hiding'.
We have investigated reliability of signals of aggressive intent in sparrows by first eliciting aggressive signaling by territory owners using playback on their territories, and then giving the owner the opportunity to attack a taxidermic mount of a conspecific. Because the receiver is an inanimate model that never responds to a subject's signals, receiver response is controlled in these experiments. In song sparrows (Searcy et al., 2006) , no display given during a 5-min initial recording period (before the mount was revealed) differed significantly between attackers and non-attackers, though the number of soft songs came close (P = 0.051). For the 1 min prior to attack, attackers gave significantly more soft songs (P = 0.00015), and number of soft songs was the only display to classify attackers and non-attackers successfully in a discriminant function analysis. In swamp sparrows, the number of soft songs was again the best predictor of attack (Ballentine et al., 2008) . Attackers gave significantly more soft song than non-attackers in both the initial recording period (P < 0.0001) and the 1 min before attack (P < 0.0001), and also gave significantly more wing-wave displays. A discriminant function that combined the number of soft songs with the number of rasp calls was a significant predictor of attack for the initial recording period, as was a function combining number of soft songs and number of wing waves for the one minute before attack. In both species, then, soft song was the single display that best predicted attack. Subsequent work has shown that soft songs also predict attack in the black-throated blue warbler (Dendroica caerulescens) (Hof & Hazlett, 2010) , as do soft calls in the corn crake (Crex crex) (Rek & Osiejuk, 2011) .
Although displays predicted attack in our experiments with song sparrows and swamp sparrows, prediction was imperfect: the best discriminant functions correctly classified only 74% of song sparrows and 85% of swamp sparrows as attackers or non-attackers. Soft song, thus, is somewhat reliable as a predictor of attack, but that reliability is limited. The bluffing hypothesis proposes that reliability is limited because bluffing is widespread. Here we use previously unanalyzed data from our earlier studies of song and swamp sparrows (Searcy et al., 2006; Ballentine et al., 2008) to test two predictions of this hypothesis.
(1) Most individuals should give large numbers of soft songs. The rationale is that the bluffing hypothesis assumes that selection has favored exaggeration. Most individuals then should be either unaggressive and bluffing or aggressive and honest, and either way should produce many soft songs. A more precise formulation of this prediction is that the distribution of the number of soft songs given per individual should show negative skew, meaning that the modal number of displays is shifted towards the maximum with a long tail towards low number of displays. (2) Unreliable signaling should be dominated by over-signaling (aggressive signals not followed by attack) rather than by under-signaling (non-aggressive signals followed by attack). This prediction is an obvious consequence of the hypothesis that it is bluffing that limits reliability.
Methods
We present new analyses of data from two earlier studies of signal reliability in sparrows. Details on the methods can be obtained from Searcy et al. (2006) for the song sparrow study and from Ballentine et al. (2008) for the swamp sparrow study. Briefly, both studies were conducted in Crawford County, PA, USA. The song sparrow work was performed May-June in 2000 , 2001 and 2002 , and the swamp sparrow work in May-June 2006. Sample sizes were 95 territorial males for song sparrows and 40 territorial males for swamp sparrows.
The experimental design in both studies was to use playback of conspecific song to elicit aggressive signaling from territorial males, and then give those males an opportunity to attack a taxidermic mount, with the statistical analysis focusing on whether aggressive signals could be used to predict which subjects would subsequently attack. Before trials we set a loudspeaker (Nagra DSM) face-up on a subject's territory, directly on the ground for song sparrows and on a portable support to hold the speaker above water for swamp sparrows. Directly above the loudspeaker we placed a platform holding a taxidermic mount of the correct species, which was initially covered. Trials were recorded on a stereo recorder, with one channel connected to a microphone in a parabola held by an observer, and the second connected to a microphone attached to a pole fixed next to the speaker. Two observers stood 15-20 m from the speaker setup, one of whom recorded the trial with the parabola and microphone, while the other observed the subject, using binoculars when needed. This second observer gave a verbal narration of the behavior of the subject, which was recorded for later transcription.
Trials began with 1 min of playback consisting of one conspecific song repeated at the rate of one song per 10 s. For playback to song sparrows we used one of the subject's own songs, whereas for playback to swamp sparrows we used a shared song type produced by an unfamiliar individual. At 5 min and 45 s into the trial, the taxidermic mount was exposed (remotely for song sparrows and by a person advancing to the playback apparatus for swamp sparrows). At 6 min a second playback was begun. The second playback was two minutes long and contained the same song as in the initial playback repeated at the same rate. The subject was observed and recorded until 20 min had elapsed from the first song of the initial playback, or until the mount was attacked, whichever came first. For the song sparrow study, attack was defined as direct physical contact; for the swamp sparrow study, both direct physical contact and dives in which the subject passed within 1 m of the mount were included as attacks.
Behaviors noted by the observer included soft songs, broadcast songs, and wing-waves for both species, and two types of calls (rasps and wheezes) for swamp sparrows. Distance of the subject to the mount/speaker was estimated with the aid of flagging tied to vegetation at measured distances of 2, 4 and 8 m from the speaker. Accuracy of the observer in discriminating soft songs from broadcast songs was confirmed in two ways: in field tests in which songs were played back from a loudspeaker at known amplitudes (Searcy et al., 2006) , and through observations in which the observer classified naturally produced songs as loud or soft while they were simultaneously recorded with a calibrated microphone for later measurement of amplitude (Anderson et al., 2008) . The latter observations showed that though we were quite successful in classifying songs as being above or below an amplitude threshold (at about 77 dB SPL at 1 m), song amplitude actually showed a continuous distribution in song sparrows rather than a discontinuous or bimodal one (Anderson et al., 2008) .
Analysis in both studies concentrated on two time periods: the initial five-minute recording period before the mount was revealed, and the final one-minute before attack. For subjects that did not attack, the final 1 min was designated by randomly pairing each non-attacker with an attacker, and using the same 1-min period in the former as in the latter. This procedure controlled for the possibility that signaling changed systematically with time through over the course of trials.
Results

Frequency distributions of aggressive displays
The first prediction of the bluffing hypothesis that we test is that the number of aggressive displays given per individual should show a negatively skewed distribution, that is, a frequency distribution in which the mode is shifted towards the maximum, producing a long tail to the left (see inset in Figure 1a ). When we look at the distribution of numbers of soft songs given by male song sparrows during the initial recording period (Figure 1a) , we see quite the opposite distribution: most males give near the minimum number of soft songs (i.e., 0), and the long tail of the distribution is to the right instead of to the left. The maximum number of displays given in 5 min is 32, and few males approach this maximum. The distribution of soft songs given in the final 1 min (Figure 1b ) also is positively rather than negatively skewed. Here the maximum (12 soft songs) is lower because of the shorter time period, but again most individuals give near the minimum rather than the maximum number of displays.
The frequency distribution of soft songs per subject in swamp sparrows gives a similar picture: positive rather than negative skew (Figure 2) . The maximum number of soft songs given by a swamp sparrow in the 5-min initial period is 37 (Figure 2a) , and again no other subject approaches this maximum. The modal number of soft songs is displaced towards the minimum rather than the maximum, with a majority of males giving 0 soft songs. Numbers of soft songs are lower for the final 1 min, but the form of the distribution is very similar (Figure 2b) , with again a majority of individuals giving no soft songs.
Over-signaling vs. under-signaling
To test the prediction that over-signaling should be more common than under-signaling, we constructed two-by-two contingency tables, with indi- viduals classified by whether they did or did not attack the mount, and by whether they gave more or fewer than the mean number of soft songs for a given time period. For song sparrows during the initial five-minute period (Table 1) , 24 males gave more than the mean number of soft songs and did not attack, compared to 11 that gave fewer than the mean and did attack. Thus in terms of raw numbers, over-signaling was more common than under-signaling. As a percentage of individuals in the corresponding behavior category (i.e., attackers or non-attackers), however, under-signaling was The pattern in the lower left cell of each matrix (many soft songs/no attack) constitutes over-signaling, whereas the pattern in the upper right cell (few soft songs/attack) constitutes under-signaling. The remaining two cells represent reliable signaling. The distinction between 'many' and 'few' soft songs is relative to the mean number for each period.
more common: 55% of attackers under-signaled, whereas only 32% of nonattackers over-signaled. The same pattern held for song sparrows during the 1 min before attack (Table 1) : in terms of numbers, more individuals oversignaled (17) than under-signaled (8), but in terms of percentages, undersignaling was more frequent (40% of attackers) than was over-signaling (23% of non-attackers).
For swamp sparrows, over-signaling did not predominate in terms of either raw numbers or proportions. For the initial five-minute period (Table 2) , Table 2 . Under-signaling, over-signaling and reliable signaling by swamp sparrow males during the initial 5-min period and the final 1 min before attack.
No attack Attack
Initial 5-min period Few soft songs ( 2) 28 males 3 males Many soft songs (>2) 3 males 6 males
Final 1 min before attack Few soft songs ( 1) 30 males 4 males Many soft songs (>1) 1 male 5 males
The pattern in the lower left cell of each matrix (many soft songs/no attack) constitutes over-signaling, whereas the pattern in the upper right cell (few soft songs/attack) constitutes under-signaling. The remaining two cells represent reliable signaling. The distinction between 'many' and 'few' soft songs is relative to the mean number for each period.
3 individuals over-signaled and 3 under-signaled; in terms of percentages this translates to 9.7% of non-attackers over-signaling and 33% of attackers under-signaling. For the 1-min period before attack, 1 individual oversignaled and 4 individuals under-signaled; these numbers translate into 3.2% of non-attackers over-signaling and 44% of attackers under-signaling.
Discussion
The bluffing hypothesis proposes that the reliability of aggressive signaling is limited principally by the spread of bluffing. We tested two predictions of this hypothesis, and found neither to be supported for either of our study species. The first prediction we addressed was that the frequency distribution of number of aggressive displays given per individual should be negatively skewed, with many individuals giving near the maximum number of aggressive displays per time period. This prediction is a consequence of the expectation that bluffing will be advantageous, and will spread until it corrupts the signaling system; in Maynard Smith's words, if receivers can be intimidated by aggressive signals, then "before long, everyone would be lying" (Maynard Smith, 1979) . We evaluated this prediction with respect to soft songs, the most aggressive display given in both our study species. For both these species, our evidence diametrically opposed the prediction: the modal numbers of displays were displaced towards the minimum rather than towards the maximum, and the long, thin tail of the distributions extended towards high rather than low numbers of displays.
The second prediction we tested was that among unreliable signalers, over-signaling should predominate over under-signaling. Over-signaling means giving aggressive signals and then not following with attack; as this pattern is the behavioral manifestation of bluffing, the prediction of its predominance flows logically from the bluffing hypothesis. Under-signaling means giving a non-aggressive signal, or no signal at all, and then attacking. In song sparrows, over-signaling was more common than under-signaling in absolute terms, but in terms of the percentage of individuals to whom these patterns were available, under-signaling was actually more frequent than over-signaling. In swamp sparrows, under-signaling was more common than over-signaling in both absolute and percentage terms. In retrospect, evidence for the prevalence of under-signaling in our sparrows was already apparent in our earlier analyses, hidden in the fact that soft song was more successful in identifying non-attackers than in identifying attackers (Searcy et al., 2006; Ballentine et al., 2008) . This pattern implies that there are fewer exceptions to the rule that non-attackers give few soft songs than to the rule that attackers give many.
One question raised by these results is whether over-signaling actually represents bluffing, that is an evolved strategy to intimidate opponents deceptively. One alternative explanation for over-signaling is that it occurs due to error, either on the part of the signalers or on the part of the receivers (Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011) . Receivers can be expected to misclassify signals a certain proportion of the time, because the properties of signal classes overlap (Wiley, 1994) or because those properties degrade during transmission (Wiley & Richards, 1978) . In the case of our experiments, the receiver was a human observer whose accuracy in classifying signals was verified experimentally (Searcy et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2008) ; nevertheless, some error must have occurred. Signalers must also be expected to make some errors in formulating signals (Botero et al., 2010) , for example in translating intentions to the appropriate signal. Another explanation for oversignaling is contingency; that is, dependence on events that occur between the time the signals are produced and the time that an aggressive behavior is or is not given (Searcy et al., 2006) . Models of aggressive signaling allow the subsequent behavior of the signaler to be contingent on a receiver's response, but in our experiments that contingency was controlled, in the sense that receiver response was always the same (i.e., the taxidermic mount did nothing). Other contingencies are nevertheless possible; for example a signaler might be distracted from attacking the mount by the appearance of a potential predator, a rival male, or a fertile female. Despite these alternative explanations for over-signaling, it seems possible that some proportion of over-signalers were bluffing. To support that conclusion, we would need to show that over-signalers benefit from intimidating opponents, as has been shown for stomatopods (Adams & Caldwell, 1990) ; thus far we have not found a method for testing for such intimidation in sparrows.
Under-signaling
Our most surprising finding is how widespread under-signaling is in the behavior of both our study species. As with over-signaling, under-signaling could occur as part of an evolved strategy, or it could occur due to error or contingency. Some level of error seems inevitable, but contingency does not seem as likely an explanation for under-signaling as for over-signaling, at least not in experiments such as ours, in which the receiver cannot escalate the encounter. With this experimental design, it is not obvious what kind of contingency could intervene after signaling to encourage rather than discourage attack.
We use the label 'low-balling' to describe under-signaling as an evolved strategy. To qualify as an evolved strategy, low-balling must have some selective advantage that explains its evolution. Christy & Rittschof (2011) have suggested that an advantage of low-balling might be to allow a signaler to blind-side an opponent, that is, to attack before the opponent can prepare itself for defense. Blind-siding might have some relevance in sparrow interactions, but below we suggest an alternative adaptive explanation for low-balling.
Assume that the benefit of aggressive signaling for a territorial sparrow is that by making the appropriate threats, it can expel an intruder without the cost of physically attacking that intruder. It is reasonable to expect that the cost of attacking an intruder goes down as the fighting ability, or RHP, of the owner increases (Figure 3) . The cost of attack will also depend on the RHP of the intruder, but this quantity must often be unknown to the territory owner, in which case the best course for the owner is to assume the intruder has RHP equal to the average for intruders as a class. We also assume that aggressive signaling has an opportunity cost, meaning that time spent in aggressive signaling prevents an actor from performing other beneficial activities, such as foraging, mate guarding, feeding young, and so forth, and that this opportunity cost is independent of RHP ( Figure 3) . Aggressive signaling then is of net advantage only when the cost of attack exceeds the opportunity cost of signaling. For signalers of high RHP, this condition does not apply (Figure 3 ), and they are therefore expected to dispense with aggressive signaling, and attack as soon as possible. As under-signaling in this scenario is adaptive, this behavior constitutes a low-balling strategy. We will refer to the explanation for under-signaling illustrated in Figure 3 as the 'opportunity cost' model. The opportunity cost model makes a prediction that is testable at least in principle: under-signaling should be performed mainly or exclusively by those individuals with the highest fighting ability (see Figure 3) . If undersignaling occurs due to error, then the behavior should be random with Figure 3 . The opportunity-cost model of under-signaling in aggressive encounters. The fitness cost of attacking an intruder declines as the RHP of the signaler increases, whereas the opportunity cost of signaling does not vary with signaler RHP. Individuals of low RHP are selected to signal, whereas individuals whose RHP is greater than the critical value indicated by the asterisk should attack without signaling; these latter individuals thus are predicted to low-ball.
respect to any characteristic of the signaler, including fighting ability. Blindsiding also seems at least as likely to occur among individuals of low fighting ability as among those of high ability. Thus the association between RHP and under-signaling is predicted exclusively by the opportunity cost model. To test the prediction for song and swamp sparrows, we will need first to develop an objective method of measuring fighting ability that can be applied in advance of measuring the outcomes of aggressive signaling interactions.
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